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Desert Earth: Geophilosophy and the Anthropocene 
 
Abstract: 
 
The figure of the desert features extensively throughout the two volumes of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia and is a recurring motif in Deleuzeǯs sole-authored 
works. While recent book length studies place geophilosophy at the forefront of 
Deleuze and Guattariǯs thought ȋFlaxman 2012; Woodard 2013; Gasché 2014), 
the theme of the desert is mentioned in these studies only in passing, if at all. Understanding the role of the desert in the evolution of Deleuze and Guattariǯs 
collaborative enterprise is, however, important for a number of reasons: firstly, 
it allows us to track the relationship between schizoanalysis and the wider 
project of geophilosophy and why the one necessary implies the other. Secondly, it helps us to position Deleuze and Guattariǯs work relative to other key figures 
such as Nietzsche and Heidegger who employ images of deserts and wastelands 
in their critique of modernity. Thirdly, and most importantly, it gives us a 
framework for theorizing the Anthropocene—and the forms of capitalist 
spatiality that dominate it—as an epoch of both physical and metaphysical 
desertification in which the relationship between life and its material ground becomes ever more uncertain. The article concludes by relating Deleuzeǯs 
remarks on desert islands to our contemporary environmental condition.  
 
 
I. Desert Desire   
 
The theme of the desert occupies a curious place in Deleuzeǯs work, positioned 
somewhere between a concept proper and an aesthetic figure. From his earliest 
writing, the desert is used to evoke the sense of a Ǯworld without othersǯ. The 
early article ǮDesert )slandsǯ, for example, discusses the Robinsonades of Defoe 
and Giraudoux and argues that the literary figure of the desert island manifests a Ǯmythical recreation of the worldǯ (Deleuze 2004: 12). Creation is defined here as 
a geoaesthetic movement of separation and beginning anew. Our aesthetic 
fascination with geography more generally may thus be said to embody the 
deterritorialising movement of desire. We can discern here an important link 
between desire as flight or errancy and the desert as a nomadic topography, the word Ǯdesertǯ stemming from the Greek Ǯeremosǯ, meaning not only a barren or 
empty place but a place into which one may flee, as an eremite. It is all too easy 
to write off Deleuzeǯs fascination with desert islands—to which I return in more 
detail below—as the manifestation of an escapist or regressively Ǯother-worldlyǯ tendency in Deleuzeǯs thought, as (allward does ȋ(allward ʹͲͲ͸: ʹ͵Ȍ. What ) 
argue here, however, is that a consideration of the desert contributes much to 
our understanding of what Gregg Lambert has called Deleuze and Guattariǯs Ǯpolitical geologyǯ (Lambert 2005: 220). This is especially relevant when it comes 
to theorizing the Anthropocene, which has been characterized by some as an age 
of deserts (Eswaran, Reich and Veraslip 2006; Vince 2014: 192).   
 
The desert imagery deployed throughout Anti-Oedipus forms a key part of the 
mythopoetic, frequently apocalyptic, style in which that book was written. Yet 
there is a conceptual consistency at work in this desert poetics that can to be 
used to understand how the schizoanalytic conception of desire involves the 
production of a particular kind of space. The body without organs—a concept I 
return to throughout—is frequently defined in topographical terms as Ǯthe edge 
of the deterritorialized socius, the desert at the gates of the cityǯ on which desire, 
freed from its investment in social reproduction, roams nomadically (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983: 102Ȍ. The Ǯrevolutionary investment of desireǯ is thus said to be Ǯdesert-desireǯ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 378). From the libidinal and 
emotional impoverishment generally associated with schizophrenia, Deleuze and 
Guattari seek to extrapolate the principles of the production of reality itself: 
 
everything has been said about the paucity of reality, the loss of reality, 
the lack of contact with life, autism and athymia. Schizophrenics 
themselves have said everything there is to say about this, and have been 
quick to slip into the expected clinical mold. Dark world, growing desert: a 
solitary machine hums on the beach, an atomic factory installed in the 
desert. But if the body without organs is indeed this desert, it is as an 
indivisible, nondecomposable distance over which the schizo glides in 
order to be everywhere something real is produced, everywhere 
something real has been and will be produced. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983: 86) 
 
We shall see to what extent this idea of a production of reality from the basis of a 
zero intensity state, conceived via the aesthetics of the desert, encompasses much of Deleuzeǯs thought.  
 
Throughout A Thousand Plateaus, the desert theme is developed in increasingly 
complex ways. Deleuze and Guattari argue that European Romanticism in its 
different forms, including its fascistic variants, invokes depopulation, the 
absence of a people, through an experience of the Earth as Ǯsolitaryǯ or Ǯdesertedǯ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 340). Likewise, they tell us that modernist 
composer Varèseǯs Dèserts Ǯpopulated the Gobi desert with insects and stars 
constituting a becoming-music of the worldǯ ȋDeleuze and Guattari 1987: 309). The Ǯdenuded treeǯ of the Wolf-Manǯs dream is a Ǯfull bodyǯ on which desire can 
be redistributed anew according to the logic of animal packs. The production of 
any multiplicity is repeatedly said to require a bare or impoverished surface of 
this sort on which the ties of old lineages can be dissolved.  
 
The desert and steppe are frequently used to exemplify smooth or intensive 
space. Smooth space is defined through the concept of the nomos, an ancient 
Greek term relating to the inhabitation of spaces peripheral to the city: Ǯ[the 
nomos] stands in opposition to the law or the polis, as the backcountry, a 
mountainside, or the vague expanse around a cityǯ ȋDeleuze and Guattari ͳͻͺ͹: 
380). In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze had begun articulating an Ǯaesthetic of intensitiesǯ forming the basis of the concept of smooth space (Deleuze 1994: 
244). The properties by which we perceive space—length, area, volume—exist not only as measurable quantities but as immeasurable, purely Ǯidealǯ or 
intensive differences: distance in itself, size in itself. These intensive quantities 
constitute a transcendental aesthetic—the conditions governing all sense 
perception—by way of a paradox: they cannot be perceived because their 
realization in measurable extensity conceals or—in thermodynamic terms—Ǯcancelsǯ them, hence their pure ideality. But they are also Ǯwhat can only be perceivedǯ in that they alone furnish the energetic raw material from which our 
perceptions forge reality (Deleuze 1994: 231).  
 
Deleuze is drawing on a philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato when he 
maintains that the ground of physical reality is ideal. But he also subverts this 
tradition by suggesting that ideality leads us into groundlessness. The closer we 
try to get to the physical ground of the thing-in-itself the more we approach an Ǯungroundǯ ȋDeleuze ͳͻͻͶ: 288-9). Objects in space possess the physical depth 
and permanence they do by keeping this unground, or metaphysical depth, 
concealed in extensive forms. Crucially, however, the unground becomes 
accessible to thought not as some abyssal nothingness behind appearances but 
as a pure surface. The ground Ǯrises to the surfaceǯ, as if our perception were part 
of the genesis of matter itself (Deleuze 1994: 275). There is a point at which we 
discern something absolute in space—intensive quantities, differences in their 
pure form: distance in itself or size in itself. These intensities are ideal, but—
crucially from the point of view of Deleuzeǯs political philosophy—they are not 
rational. In fact, they precipitate a collapse of rational categories into a delirium; they cause a Ǯcatastropheǯ to overwhelm the rational order of our 
representations (Deleuze 1994: 35). Deleuze borrows from Schelling the geological example of a volcanic line whose eruption announces Ǯuniversal 
“ungrounding”’ (Deleuze 1994: 230). The ideality of grounding thus forms a 
paradoxical identity with the irrational thing-in-itself.  
 
This is what explains why Deleuze and Guattariǯs account of the production of 
space is based much less on a history of labour and social relations—as it is, for example, in (enri Lefebvreǯs work—than a history of desire and perception. 
While, for Lefebvre, Ǯbodies—deployments of energy—produce space and 
produce themselves, along with their motions, according to the laws of spaceǯ, for 
Deleuze and Guattari the body produces space precisely through an overturning 
of law, including the law of entropy itself (Lefebvre 1991: 171). The body 
without organs is produced by a libidinal energy crisis of the desiring 
machines—what psychiatry calls schizophrenia—by which the machines freeze or Ǯstop deadǯ. The petrified, rigidified body that results is marked by an 
impoverishment of life. But, to the extent that the body has been stripped bare of 
its organic investments, it provides a new ground via an ungrounding by which 
the rational divisions of space characteristic of the polis, or State form, as 
opposed to the nomos, may be critiqued, challenged and resisted.   
 
 
II. Desert Immanence 
 
In his discussions of grounding Deleuze is exploiting a tension deeply embedded 
in the Western experience of space which Deleuze and Guattari develop in 
overtly environmental and agricultural terms. )f Ǯthe tree has dominated Western 
reality and all of Western thoughtǯ, they argue, then this is because Western culture has generally adopted the form of the Ǯroot-foundation: Grund, racine, 
fondementǯ. The metaphysics of grounding and the physics of cultivation are 
implicated in one another: Ǯthe West has a special relation to the forest, and 
deforestation: the fields carved from the forest are populated with seed plants 
produced by cultivation based on species lineages of the arborescent typeǯ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 18). But this obsession with roots has from the very 
first coexisted with forms of cultivation that draw close to desert experience. The 
clearing of forests is, after all, a deracination. It is thus only against the backdrop 
of rootlessness that Western arborescence emerges.  
 
The very notion of transcendence, Ǯa specifically European diseaseǯ, has its 
origins in the desert experience of the seminomadic Biblical Hebrews (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 18). As Bible scholar Herbert Schneidau writes,  
 
to Bedouin, as to Don Juan in Mexico, the desert is full of immanent Ǯpower spots,ǯ the landscape is mythologized, and is neither lifeless nor 
terrifying. But to the seminomad who must live next to it yet could not 
flourish on it, the desertǯs formlessness could suggest … the ǮWholly Other.ǯ Ultimately, it is the discontinuity of the desert with the usual forms 
of life that could give the paradox of a concrete image of transcendence. 
(Schneidau 1976: 143)   
 
Western culture developed in close proximity to deserts in a way that has lead to 
a complex entanglement of immanence and transcendence. Environmental 
philosopher Paul Shepard maintains that Ǯthe dry landscapes of Egypt, Sumer, 
Assyria, Palestine, and the Eastern European and Eurasian borders of the 
Mediterranean Sea fashioned many of the concepts that define Occidental civilizationǯ ȋShepard 1982: 47). The opposition of immanence and 
transcendence is thus not a dualism but relates to different ways of perceiving 
the same space: the desert, with its unbroken expanses, can suggest pure 
presence or continuity, but in its hostility to organic life it also suggests the 
radical discontinuity of a world left bereft by a presence that has withdrawn to 
the heavens.   
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy began in the commercial world of 
Greece, which was Ǯlike an ǲinternational marketǳ organized along the borders of 
the Orientǯ. The Greek archipelago constituted a zone of immanence in relation to 
the transcendent model of the archaic eastern imperial States. The first philosophers are those who Ǯcome from the borderlands of the Greek world, 
strangers in flight, breaking with empire and colonized by people of Apolloǯ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 87). The historian Jean-Piere Vernant would appear 
to back this up when he argues that the Platonic innovation of the immortal, 
rational soul arose not with the Dionysian cults but with the iatromanteis, literally Ǯphysician-seersǯ who Ǯwhere the precursors of the philosophers and 
whose legend suggests a comparison with the figure and conduct of the shaman of the civilizations of northern Asiaǯ. These shamanic or sage-like figures Ǯare 
individuals on the margins of the social group, distinguished by their asceticism, 
which might include retreats in the desertǯ ȋVernant 2006: 384).  
 
It was Nietzsche who first proposed that the philosopher emerged from desert ascetics: ǮIn the desert the truthful have always dwelled, the free spirits, as the 
rulers of the desert; but in the cities dwell the well-fed, famous wise men—the draft animalsǯ ȋNietzsche 2006: 80). The first philosophers followed the religious 
ascetics into the wastes, drawn there by a promise of sovereignty, and 
philosophical abstraction is thus seen as inseperable from this dissolution of 
social bonds provided by the desert. But the philosophers returned to the 
marketplace, bringing something of the desert back with them. As Vernant suggests, the Greek cityǯs Ǯsocial institutions established the separation between 
nature and society that is the conceptual prerequisite for the exercise of rational 
thought. With the coming of the city, the political order was separated from the organization of the cosmosǯ. This broke the old continuity of nature and society 
and the philosopherǯs success was in part down to his ability to theorise this new 
separation and thus contribute to social harmony. Desert immanence, in the 
form of metaphysical abstraction, is established within the transcendence of law: 
just as nature or phusis could be judged to be purposeful, so too could social 
order be submitted to a just measure. Vernant argues that there emerges in the 
sixth century BC a new distribution, replacing the old nomos, based on an 
abstract conception of justice characterized by isonomia or geometrical equality 
stressing equilibrium and the balance of forces (Vernant 2006: 387-8). 
 
III. Desert Earth 
 
What geophilosophy amounts to, then, is a means of tracing the relationships 
between thought, politics, and space that have dominated Western 
consciousness, but it also insists that our concepts and institutions have been 
geographically conditioned. We have yet to explore this in relation to the 
Anthropocene, but we can note how the desert plays a key yet extremely 
ambiguous role in all these respects both as physical space and metaphysical 
topos. Deleuze and Guattari even suggest, at one point, that desire as a political 
force can be first detected in the ascetic Christians of the third to the fifth 
centuries who fled the Roman Empire for the deserts of Egypt, Syria, and 
Palestine. In figures such as St. Anthony, a simultaneous retreat from the world 
and an attempt to reconstitute it as a spiritual empire in the wilderness gave rise 
to the duality of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation that defines the 
modern State (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 222).  
 
Throughout Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari develop Nietzscheǯs contention 
that capitalism is established within the Christian ascetic ideal and produces a 
secularized form of it in its insistence on the punitive logic of debt. Marx 
diagnosed the essential contradiction of capital as the ever-diminishing relative rate of profit accompanying every absolute increase. Deleuze and Guattariǯs 
Nietzschean interpretation of this is that the capitalist machine works via a self-
inhibiting movement akin to the paradox of a growing barrenness. The means by 
which money produces money realizes a form of growth shorn from life yet 
which continues to rely on the formal properties of organic reproduction:  
 
Capital is indeed the body without organs of the capitalist, or rather of the 
capitalist being. But as such, it is not only the fluid and petrified substance 
of money, for it will give to the sterility of money the form whereby 
money produces money. It produces surplus value, just as the body 
without organs reproduces itself, puts forth shoots, and branches out to 
the farthest corners of the universe. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 10) 
 
With this arborescent desert, capital takes on the role previously occupied, in the 
primitive social machine, by the Earth. If the latter is typically mythologized as a 
primary fertility, a cosmic egg or placenta, then the capitalist socius recreates the 
Earth in its own image as a mode of propagation without life. As the State 
acquires global reach through surveillance technologies and military expansion, 
it needs an immanent environment in which to move and must regard the Earth 
as a vast smooth space:  
 
one no longer goes from one point to another, but rather holds space 
beginning from any point: instead of striating space, one occupies it with a 
vector of deterritorialization in perpetual motion. This modern strategy 
was communicated from the sea to the air, as the new smooth space, but 
also to the entire Earth considered as desert or sea. As converter and 
capturer, the State does not just relativize movement, it reimparts 
absolute movement. It does not just go from the smooth to the striated, it 
reconstitutes smooth space; it reimparts smooth in the wake of the 
striated. It is true that this new nomadism accompanies a worldwide war 
machine whose organization exceeds the State apparatuses and passes 
into energy, military-industrial, and multinational complexes. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 387) 
 
It is no longer a question of a simple opposition of smooth and striated but of a 
worldwide mode of production of smooth space that State power must find ways 
to manage. This suggests a kind a desert theopolitics of the modern State. 
Deleuze and Guattari observe that religions have so often taken root in the desert because they need an Ǯencompassing elementǯ to oppose to a Ǯcenterǯ: Ǯthe entire 
history of the desert concerns the possibility of its becoming the encompassing 
element, and also of being repelled, rejected by the center, as though in an inversion of movementǯ ȋDeleuze and Guattari ͳͻͺ͹: ͷ͹Ͷ). The desert provides a 
geography in which transcendence is continually reclaimed within an expanding immanence. Thus, Ǯthe great imperial religions need a smooth space like the 
desert, but only in order to give it a law that is opposed to the nomos in every 
way, and converts the absoluteǯ ȋDeleuze and Guattari ͳͻͺ͹: Ͷͻͷ). Capitalist 
globalisation itself is a chapter in the history of desert immanence: ǮThe absolute 
is now the horizon or background, in other words, the Encompassing Element 
without which nothing would be global or englobedǯ ȋDeleuze and Guattari ͳͻͺ͹: 
494).  
 
A geophilosophy of the Anthropocene would surely have to acknowledge how, 
since the 18th century, the concept of nature has played the role of encompassing 
element in a way that has shaped our contemporary environmental condition. 
Timothy Morton has argued that many of the key ideas of environmentalism 
stem from a Romantic era aesthetics that sought to evoke an idea of the environment as a surrounding atmosphere: Ǯthe rhetoric of nature depends upon 
something I define as an ambient poetics, a way of conjuring up a sense of a 
surrounding atmosphere or worldǯ ȋMorton ʹͲͲ͹: 22). We find such rhetoric 
running through the language of Wordsworth and Shelley, for example. Mortonǯs 
polemic is that contemporary environmental consciousness suffers as a result of 
its Romantic heritage from the contradictory position that nature is said to be, at once, a substantial ǮThing Over Thereǯ, withdrawn and separate from us, and an 
ethereal medium that exists in-between things, holding them together (Morton 
2007: 1). We can leave Mortonǯs object oriented solution to this problem to one 
side and observe that the deadlock he describes corresponds to the foregoing 
account of geophilosophy: nature is habitually invoked by environmental 
discourse as both a transcendent, withdrawn object and an immanent, 
encompassing world.  
 
Understood in this way, geophilosophy offers some key resources for theorising 
the spread of physical deserts that has come to define our contemporary 
environmental condition. What is called Ǯdesertificationǯ has been acknowledged 
as a key aspect of life in the Anthropocene (Eswaran, Reich and Veraslip 2006). 
While definitions have been hotly contested by environmental and social 
scientists, desertification generally relates to the ways in which the productivity 
of land degrades as a result of human practices such as overgrazing and 
deforestation. While it has been acknowledged as a major problem occurring on 
every inhabited continent, with some accounts suggesting that arable land is 
being lost at a rate of 12 million hectares a year (Vince 2014: 192), debates over 
the causes of desertification often centre on the cultural and aesthetic values 
attached to desert landscapes and the biases ingrained in Western conceptions 
of nature.  
 
At issue in the political ecology of desertification is the link between value—
cultural and economic—and the land as ground of human activity. The forced 
settlement of nomads has a long history in colonial policy, and a certain image of 
the desert as a place nefarious rootlessness has accompanied this. The French 
colonial administration in Africa, for example, sought to settle nomads not only 
for ecological reasons or to manage the population but because it was deemed necessary as part of their Ǯcivilising missionǯ ȋBenjaminsen and Berge 2004: 52). 
Today, however, it is recognized that one of the major causes of desertification in 
Africa has been Ǯthe conversion of nomadic pastoral societies to sedentary 
lifestyles with a focus on raising cash crops instead of subsistence onesǯ ȋWhyte 
2013: 143). Nevertheless, the image of the desert as the site of social and moral 
degeneration retains a currency. 
 
Recent work on desertification has drawn on Deleuze and Guattari to 
acknowledge the baleful influence of a certain view of the natural environment 
based on ideas of predictability and equilibrium. In the colonial encounters in the ǮNew Worldǯ deserts of Australia, the Americas and Southern Africa,  
 
landscapes have been carved into fenced holdings with defined livestock 
carrying capacities, while people have been encouraged and coerced to 
settle, often in bounded reservations and following ethnicide … or as an 
underclass and labour pool … ǮWild landsǯ have been purified of 
undesirable beasts—from wild dog to tsetse fly—only to later become the desired and imagined spaces of Ǯuntouched Edenic Natureǯ, or the locales 
of various Ǯcommunity-based conservationǯ schemes designed to Ǯupfrontǯ 
wildlife and wild landscapes. (Sullivan and Homewood 2003: 7).   
 
It was the agricultural stratificiation of these non-Western smooth spaces that 
created the conditions for land degradation. To an eye accustomed to 
territorialized and stratified space, deserts suffer from being systems lacking 
equilibrium and stability. Estimations of land productivity are thus made against 
a conception of the natural environment as a system in equilibrium. Nature can 
only function as an encompassing element if it remains an indifferent 
background, a terra nullius for human achievement. To the extent that it fails in 
this role, it becomes an endangered object, an untouchable Eden. It has been 
widely acknowledged that once non-equilibrium dynamics are applied to 
dryland ecologies, our valuation of land productivity changes correspondingly 
and we can see that nomadic land practices, far from spreading the desert, may 
in fact be perfectly suited to life in it. Our metaphysics of nature, however, 
prevent us from seeing in what sense the desert produces, just as colonial 
agriculture stifled nomadism.  
  
In short, desertification as a physical process involves a metaphysics of values, 
and this is why it has lead to so much contention among scientists. But, 
extrapolating from this, we can suggest in a properly geophilosophical register 
that the desert is precisely where the link between ground and value becomes 
broken or uncertain and thus amenable to change as our traditional methods of evaluation break down. As Deleuze says in ǮWhat is Grounding?ǯ, Ǯall who 
propose values to us appeal to a groundǯ ȋDeleuze 2015: 16). Ungrounding would 
then be a loss of all values, an abyssal Abgrund consummate with the universal 
desertification signaled in the warning cry raised by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra that Ǯthe desert growsǯ (Nietzsche 2006: 248). If, however, as 
Deleuze says with respect to Nietzsche, all values are the products of the forces 
of an evaluating agency—which might be termed will to power, becoming, desire 
or, simply, life—then ungrounding also serves to liberate this agency and 
produce new values on a global scale (Deleuze 1983: 1).  
 
 
IV. Robinson’s Paradox 
 
Desertification is the reduction or loss of the biological productivity of land, but 
this presupposes a set of values concerning what land is for and how it should be 
used. Crucially, it also presupposes a model of what Deleuze and Guattari call 
antiproduction: a limit to production, a realm of anti-value that conditions 
production as the latterǯs zero intensity ground. How could we recognize a 
landscape from which all value has disappeared, and how could we determine to 
what extent its valuelessness is human or natural in origin? These are mere 
questions of method to scientists (Bestelmeyer et al. 2015), but they go far 
beyond ecology and raise the Nietzschean problem of nihilism. For Nietzsche, a Ǯbasic fact of the human willǯ is its Ǯhorror vacuiǯ, its fear of nothingness or 
emptiness (Nietzsche 1997: 68). The will is innately capable of apprehending its 
own voiding in a generalized loss of meanings and aims. The ascetic ideal—the attachment to a Ǯspiritualǯ domain of values rather than to the physical here and 
now—emerges as a solution to this horror. Faced with the spectre of a 
nothingness of will, the will instead decides to will the nothingness of a spiritual 
reality. 
  
If, following Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari, the problem of nihilism and the 
ascetic ideal is how we should understand the history of Western consciousness 
from monotheism to capitalism, then the Anthropocene, as the product of 
capitalist modernity, is an environmental inscription of the ascetic ideal in 
global, geological terms. The ascetic ideal sought a solution to the problem of nihilism by constructing another world, a spiritual empire built from the willǯs 
own self-denial. The desert, where nature appears to void itself, was the perfect 
location for this project. Capitalism, however, disenchants empty space in a historically unprecedented way. Capitalist globalization proceeds, as weǯve seen, 
through a movement of displacement from centre to periphery. It borrows from 
religion the manner in which it displaces its own limits. It goes to the very ends 
of the Earth, to the polar wastes, but it also produces artificial wastelands and 
non-spaces within its own metropolitan centres. These, however, lack the 
sublime power of the deserts that produced the ascetic ideal. The latter, having 
once sought out the desert in order to cultivate itself, has given rise, in its 
transition from religion to capital, to a concretization of its spiritual deserts in 
the shape of the junkspaces, drosscapes and edgelands that are now 
acknowledged as an increasingly prominent feature of the post-industrial 
landscapes of the developed world (for discussions of these concepts, see 
Koolhaas 2013, Berger 2006, and Farley and Roberts 2012).   
 
We can return to the Robinsonade here as a key component of Anthropocene 
aesthetics. Robinson on his island plays out a paradox, Deleuze writes in The 
Logic of Sense, because he must eke out an existence from the meager resources 
offered by the island while obeying social and moral codes that presume the 
conquest of nature has already taken place (Deleuze 1990: 49). Deleuze 
compares this with similar paradoxes identified in different ways by Levi-Strauss 
and Lacan: we always have an excess of signifiers over signifieds, too many signs 
relative to what we actually know. No matter how totalizing our symbolic 
systems are, they fail to map fully onto the reality they are supposed to capture. 
There is thus a structural imbalance that fuels totalisation (or what Deleuze and 
Guattari will go on to call paranoia). What allows a symbolic system such as 
language to work despite this is what structuralists call the Ǯemptyǯ of Ǯfloatingǯ signifier, a signifer with a zero symbolic value. This is a mobile Ǯempty squareǯ, as Deleuze calls it, a transcendental Ǯobject = xǯ that Ǯis always displaced in relation to itselfǯ and thus allows the structure to work despite its inherent contradiction 
(Deleuze 2004: 185-6). Levi-Straussǯs concept of Ǯmanaǯ and Lacanǯs concept of 
the phallus are the best-known examples of these.  
 
The theme of the empty signifier is well known as an aspect of structuralist thought, but what is remarkable is that Deleuzeǯs engagement with it brings into 
view a geophilosophical transformation of psychoanalysis that ultimately leads 
him beyond the limitations of the latter and into the realms of schizoanalysis. 
Deleuze names the paradox of the empty signifier ǮRobinsonǯs paradoxǯ because 
he identifies its zero symbolic value with the energetic zero of the desert island. 
Two texts from different parts of Deleuzeǯs career are relevant here. The first is 
his early essay ǮDesert )slandsǯ, and the second is the appendix to The Logic of 
Sense in which he provides a quasi-Lacanian reading of Michel Tournierǯs novel 
Friday.  
 ǮDesert )slandsǯ presents us with what is perhaps Deleuzeǯs earliest articulation 
of the concept that he will come to call Ǯthe desert of the body without organsǯ. )n this text, Deleuze writes, echoing (eideggerǯs terminology, that desert islands reveal a profound opposition or Ǯstrifeǯ between land and ocean, surface and 
depth (Deleuze 2004: 9). There is a strife, a war or polemos, at work in the 
elemental heart of nature. Later (eidegger texts such as ǮThe Origin of the Work of Artǯ engage with the paradox of grounds in explicitly geophilosophical terms 
and draw on a Romantic poetics of nature: art works manifest a fundamental 
strife between the Earth, which is the withdrawn depth of things, and a world 
that discloses itself only by being grounded on the abyss of this withdrawal 
(Heidegger 1971: 47). Deleuze is clearly indebted to Heidegger in this early piece, but heǯs also developing a conception of Ǯdesertednessǯ that differs from the latterǯs.  
 )n his remarks on Nietzscheǯs growing desert (eidegger suggests that the age of 
secular, technoscientific rationality threatens to put an end to the strife of 
revelation and concealment through a technological homogenisation of 
experience (Heidegger 1968: 45-6). The modern world, in which the Earth is 
regarded as mere standing reserve of raw materials, becomes the desert of 
which Zarathustra warned. For Deleuze, on the other hand, the desert is the very 
product of elemental strife: 
 
that an island is deserted must appear philosophically normal to us. 
Humans cannot live, nor live in security, unless they assume that the 
active struggle between earth and water is over, or at least contained. … 
In one way or another, the very existence of islands is the negation of this 
point of view … humans can live on an island only by forgetting what an 
island represents. Islands are either from before or for after humankind. 
(Deleuze 2004: 9) 
 
We can never quite forget the original desertification, the shock of the original 
emptiness underlying every inhabitation; the unground rumbles beneath our 
territories and seeps into them. The desert is thus geophilosophically normal, 
but traumatic from the point of view of a life-world or a territory.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari define geophilosophy as a form of Ǯthinking that takes place 
in the relationship of territory and the earthǯ ȋDeleuze and Guattari ͳͻͻͶ: ͺͷ). At 
issue, then, is a disjunction between two kinds of origin: we are the products of 
our sociolinguistic territories or life-worlds, but we are also products of the 
Earth itself, of its geophysical processes. The inclusive disjunction between the 
two origins forms an originary desertedness, an absolute deterritorialisation 
underlying every territory. The desert is an Ǯ)dea of humanityǯ before it is a 
geographical feature because every territory presupposes a primal intimation of 
the Earth as separate and alien from us, a bare surface on which our territories 
can be formed (Deleuze 2004: 11). If we banish this Idea in order to live in a 
world, it continues to haunt the imagination, like a geological return of the 
repressed.  
 
The origin is thus displaced, as if riven by an inherent self-opposition. The Robinsonade, starting with Defoeǯs novel, presents the desert island as the site of 
a rebeginning, a Ǯsecond originǯ. Deleuze observes that myths and religions have 
long borne witness to notions of a second origin, often involving environmental 
catastrophes, such as Noahǯs flood. )n this sense, myth tells us that the origin is 
always displaced, discovered only as rediscovered:  
 
It is not enough that everything begin, everything must begin again once 
the cycle of possible combinations has come to completion. The second 
moment does not succeed the first: it is the reappearance of the first 
when the cycle of the other moments has been completed. The second 
origin is thus more essential than the first, since it gives us the law of 
repetition, the law of the series, whose first origin gave us only moments. 
(Deleuze 2004: 13) 
 
We can read in these lines the germ of Deleuzeǯs first two syntheses of time in 
Difference and Repetition, but we can also discern the emergence of the concept 
of the body without organs. The latter is described in Anti-Oedipus as Ǯan enormous undifferentiated objectǯ, an impassive whole body that interrupts the 
linear, connective chain of desiring machines which thereby experience an energy crisis as the body is flooded with antiproduction: Ǯeverything stops dead 
for a moment, everything freezes in place-and then the whole process will begin 
all over againǯ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 7). Whereas the second origin has 
been mythologized in prior societies as life giving, Ǯa cosmic eggǯ facilitating 
miraculous rebirth, for modern experience it is felt in purely economic terms as 
an energetic zero, Ǯsterileǯ and Ǯunconsumableǯ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 8). Defoeǯs desert island is in this sense the exemplary ground of the reproduction of 
capital: Ǯthe mythical recreation of the world from the deserted island gives way 
to the reconstitution of everyday bourgeois life from a reserve of capitalǯ 
(Deleuze 2004: 12).   
 
The desert island is the desacrilised second origin, the geographical 
manifestation of a horror vacui stripped of its sublimity and functioning only as a 
moment of an economic reproduction. For Defoeǯs Robinson, the problem is a 
reconstitution of bourgeois society on the basis of the second origin, but Tournierǯs reimagining allows Deleuze to speculate on how things might proceed 
differently once Robinsonǯs energies are directed not towards origins but goals:  
 
for Defoe it was the same thing to relate Robinson to the origin and to 
have him produce a world consistent with our own; it is the same thing 
for Tournier to relate him to aims and have him deviate or diverge with 
respect to the aims. Related to origins, Robinson must necessarily 
reproduce our world, but related to ends, he must deviate. (Deleuze 1990: 
303-4) 
 
In Friday, Robinsonǯs goal is not to recreate bourgeois society but Ǯǲdehumanization,ǳ the coming together of the libido and of the free elements, the 
discovery of a cosmic energyǯ ȋDeleuze ͳͻͻͲ: ͵Ͳ͵). In contrast to Levinasǯs 
reading of the story, what Robinson discovers is not a transcendent Ǯotherǯ in the 
guise of Friday, but an immanent Ǯworld without othersǯ (Levinas 1989: 148).  This is not to say that Deleuze reproduces the traditional reading of Robinsonǯs 
experience as one of heroic self-sufficiency. Rather, without others Robinson 
finds something beyond the world and beyond humanity, a Ǯpure surfaceǯ, the 
Earth as ground. This is inseparable from the discovery of a new kind of 
energetics: Ǯthe pure surface is perhaps what Others were hiding from us. It is 
perhaps at the surface, like a mist, that an unknown image of things is detached 
and, from the earth, a new surface energy without possible othersǯ ȋDeleuze 
1990: 315)  
 Lacan famously defined desire in terms of an ǮOtherǯ ingrained in us by our 
earliest experiences, a structure of exterior recognition that we internalize in 
order to give our desires meaning. Sexuality is thus defined as a relationship to 
this Other within subjectivity. But if sexuality is so prone to disorders it is 
because the Other is fundamentally lacking, its demands inscrutable or 
impossible to realise. There is no Other as such, nothing that could grant desire 
the ultimate meanings it seeks. This constitutes an energetic deadlock of lack and 
excess because desire is sustained only by way of an abyssal real that absorbs 
and neutralises it, while this real itself returns in the form of a traumatic, 
unconsumable remainder. Deleuze here can be seen as attempting to spring desire from this trap through what he calls Ǯdesert sexualityǯ. Deleuze exploits Lacanǯs account of perversion as not only a deviation with respect to aims—Freudǯs classic definition—but also as a means of suspending the lack in the 
Other. For Lacan, the pervert plugs up, Ǯdisavowsǯ, the lack in the Other and 
dissolves its essential otherness. Deleuze observes that the frozen or suffocating 
character of perverse scenarios—the iciness of Masoch, the apathy of Sade—
stems from the fact that the pervert surmounts lack by living in a world without the ǮOther structureǯ. The lack, disavowed, becomes an intensity = 0. The pervert makes of desire Ǯa virtual centre or zero pointǯ ȋDeleuze 1990: 304).  
 Desert sexuality offers something of a solution to Robinsonǯs paradox because it 
liberates desire from the structures that effect its social capture. Schizophrenia may be said to pick up where perversion leaves off in Deleuzeǯs thinking. In being 
disengaged from the structures that orient it to a world, desire becomes an exile, 
a desert desire. But through this very solitude, it becomes capable of investing 
the Earthǯs elemental strife or polemos. What Deleuze and Guattari go on to 
describe as the war machine—whose Ǯpositive objectǯ is to Ǯmake the desert, the steppe, growǯ—has its conceptual origins here (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 417).  
 
This speaks to our libidinal-economic condition today with respect to the 
Anthropocene. The energy crises that threaten our social worlds bring us face to 
face with an Earth stripped of life. We are being forced to confront a paradoxical Ǯobject = xǯ that is, at once, beyond our capacities to represent—since the very 
notion of an Earth anithetical to life, a post-Holocene Earth, is an appalling 
contradiction—but which is also the ultimate object and destination of our 
capitalist desires. Desert Earth is our Anthropocene body without organs. To this 
extent, we are mired in Robinsonǯs paradox, driven to reproduce our world even 
in the absence of the natural resources presupposed by it. But, following Deleuze, 
does this paradox not appear to provide us with the terms of its resolution? The 
Anthropocene, even as it signals the rampant anthropomorphisation of the 
planet, provides the conditions by which desire can become consistent with the Earthǯs Ǯinhumanityǯ precisely through the elemental strife revealed in the falling 
away of the world.       
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